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INTerNaTIoNaL regULaTorY CoNvergeNCe ThroUgh SoFT Law
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Since 1989, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has served as the preeminent 
international standard-setting body responsible for protecting the global financial 
system by coordinating a worldwide fight against money laundering, terrorist financing, 
and other financial crimes. Remarkably, the FATF has achieved considerable success 
in harmonizing national legal and regulatory systems without explicit, formal authority 
under international law.
 This article describes the FATF, its methods, and reasons for its effectiveness, 
and argues that the FATF’s success provides strong evidence that soft law promotes 
global consistency in financial regulation. Highly formalized approaches to 
lawmaking, such as treaties, are dispensable in this area, whereas soft law approaches 
should be looked to as the default mode for international financial regulation—and 
may prove useful in other legal fields as well.
ii. hard and sOft LaW in intErnatiOnaL finanCiaL rEgULatiOn
 A legal instrument is “hard” when it is highly authoritative. That is to say, it is 
adopted according to accepted procedures, provides concrete prescriptions, and is 
accompanied by a strong expectation of enforcement.1 An instrument is “soft” when 
it lacks these characteristics. In international law, treaties are paradigmatic of hard 
law.2 They are solemnly adopted, specific (or relatively so) in their provisions, and, in 
theory, readily enforceable through various means. Yet, treaties are seldom used in 
international financial regulation.3
 As a matter of form, there is nothing inherent in the treaty instrument that would 
make it unsuitable for addressing international financial issues. Article 2(1)(a) of the 
Vienna Convention broadly defines the term “treaty” to include agreements “concluded 
between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in 
a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation.”4 This definition does not exclude finance as an appropriate subject for 
treaty-making. Indeed, there are a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties relating 
to financial issues, and some are quite detailed. In the United States, both Article I 
congressional-executive agreements and the more traditional Article II treaties have 
been increasingly used over the past century to address a comprehensive range of topics.5 
1. See W. Michael Reisman, A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 373 (1988).
2. Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance—And Not Trade, 13 J. Int’l Econ. L. 
623, 624–27 (2010).
3. A brief review of the United Nations’ Treaty Collection on Multilateral Treaties deposited with the 
secretary-general finds only a handful of treaties that might be considered financial in nature. See 
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, United Nations Treaty Collection, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/participationstatus.aspx (last updated Nov. 6, 6:27 PM).
4. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (with Annex) art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
5. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present and Future of International Lawmaking in the 
United States, 117 Yale L.J. 1236 (2008); John Yoo, Rational Treaties: Article II, Congressional-Executive 
Agreements, and International Bargaining, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2011).
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Since World War II, Article I agreements have given the president and Congress greater 
flexibility to strike international bargains of all types without obtaining a two-thirds 
Senate majority. Nonetheless, scholars have observed that treaty-making as a discipline 
may generally be on the decline, while non-treaty-based (softer) approaches to global 
coordination are increasingly common,6 especially in the field of international financial 
regulation.
 Why is this the case? In the context of financial regulation, soft law generally 
refers to non-legislative methods of problem solving, which are typically carried out 
by transnational networks of domestic financial regulators and (in some cases) public 
or private organizations. Examples of soft law instruments include recommendations, 
memoranda of understanding, and proclamations or commitments from coordinating 
bodies such as the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
(G20).
 As a strategy, soft law responds to three challenges: (1) the demands for rapid 
responses to global financial crises; (2) the unwillingness of domestic legislatures, 
especially economically powerful ones, to cede control or sovereignty; and (3) the 
difficulty in reaching a consensus on technical issues, particularly when the outcomes 
may be subject to political tinkering as a condition of ratification.7 Soft law addresses 
these three challenges by relocating the prescriptive process to a “decentralized 
regulatory space” where technocratic networks are empowered by their national 
governments to address complicated issues and “the national-international dichotomies 
associated with public international law do not apply.”8
 National financial regulators are increasingly coordinating their actions through 
intermediary organizations designed to facilitate a higher level of multilateral action.9 
Intermediary organizations provide forums for national decisionmakers and 
stakeholders in diverse states to deliberate over solutions to shared problems. Such 
bodies also permit political and bureaucratic elites to consolidate their influence in 
order to promote global regulatory programs. For example, in 2008, following the 
onset of the global financial crisis, leaders of the world’s largest economies presented 
a united front under the auspices of the G20 by issuing declarations at a series of 
6. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 
21st Century (2012).
7. See generally Nicholas W. Turner, Dodd-Frank and International Regulatory Convergence: The Case for 
Mutual Recognition, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 391 (2012–2013).
8. Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 Geo L.J. 257, 273 
(2011).
9. Examples include the G20, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), the Committee on Payments and Settlements Systems (CPSS), and, to an extent, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. See Advancing the SEC’s Mission through 
International Organizations, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_
intlorg.shtml#monitoring (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
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summits in Washington, D.C. The agenda set at these various summits continues to 
be enacted.10
 Those who prefer the stability of a treaty-based regime may not want to see soft 
law applied to a subject as critical as the maintenance of the international financial 
system. After all, serious issues deserve the most authoritative of responses. However, 
the distinction between the two approaches matters little since both are capable of 
achieving their desired objectives. Generally speaking, soft law works because, like 
all law, it establishes expectations of appropriate conduct and controlling practice. At 
its core, law (hard or soft) is a process of communication. During the 82nd Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Michael Reisman, Myres S. 
McDougal Professor of International Law at the Yale Law School, explained:
Lawmaking at any level of social organization, and whether it is accomplished 
in a formal or informal, organized or unorganized setting, refers to the 
processes in which expectations of authority, and communications about 
intentions of control—the intention to make that authority effective—are 
generated and mobilized to sustain certain policy formulations, which are 
themselves designed to affect human behavior.11
 Following Reisman’s view, the proliferation of new types of law goes hand in 
hand with the increasing interdependence of the world’s people, the dissemination of 
communications technologies, and the introduction of new participants in the 
authoritative decisionmaking process. He explains, “The traditional diplomatic 
conduits, by which territorial-based elites have communicated and clarified their 
common interests, continue to be important, but many other international conference 
and parliamentary arenas have come into operation. In some of these, nonofficial 
actors may participate in direct or indirect fashion.”12 These alternative arenas have 
proliferated in the financial regulation field and other areas of international law.
 In his book, When International Law Works, Tai-Heng Cheng, then a professor at 
New York Law School, further developed the concept of law as a process of 
authoritative communication. Cheng writes, “In the international legal system, soft 
laws are not legal rules such as those identified in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute but 
are informal prescriptions that nonetheless authoritatively shape expectations of 
appropriate conduct by governing elites and can control outcomes in international 
problems.”13 Recent events offer clear evidence that informal prescriptions lead to 
10. See generally Turner, supra note 7, at 395 –96.
11. Reisman, supra note 1, at 373.
12. W. Michael Reisman, International Law-Making: A Process of Communication, 75 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 
Proc. 101, 106 (1981).
13. Tai-Heng Cheng, When International Law Works: Realistic Idealism After 9/11 and the 
Global Recession 199–200 (2012). Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
identifies sources of international law as including:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
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serious expectations. In the example of the G20, the proclamations of political 
elites—which continue to be elaborated and enacted by both international and 
national actors—have led to significant reforms and closer regulatory harmonization 
across major economies. The G20’s success, although imperfect, merits attention 
because it demonstrates that it is possible to achieve compliance with international 
prescriptions in the absence of legislative authority. Under the right circumstances, 
the sustained efforts of a wide range of participants operating in arenas other than 
“traditional diplomatic conduits” can shape policy globally.
 This inclusive theory of international law applies particularly to the realm of 
financial regulation, in which technocratic elites engage in rulemaking outside the 
normal political process, largely outside of the public view. Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
former dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at 
Princeton University, emphasized this point in her book, A New World Order,14 in 
which she describes the role of transgovernmental networks. She writes:
The structural core of a disaggregated world order is a set of horizontal 
networks among national government officials in their respective issue areas, 
ranging from central banking through antitrust regulation and environmental 
protection to law enforcement and human rights protection. These networks 
operate both between high-level officials directly responsive to the national 
political process—the ministerial level—as well as between lower level 
national regulators. They may be surprisingly spontaneous—informal, 
f lexible, and of varying membership—or institutionalized within official 
international organizations.15
 Chris Brummer, a professor at Georgetown University School of Law and leading 
expert on international financial regulation, further applied this notion by offering a 
detailed analysis of the global financial regulatory system in Soft Law and the Global 
Financial System.16 He explains, “Decision making is not vested in the hands of 
uninformed political elites. Rather, it is guided by a stable of skilled technocrats who 
develop shared expectations and trust allowing them to dispense with time-
consuming treaties and formal international organizations.”17 He also writes:
Soft law  .  .  . provides a decisively cheaper means of agreement-making. It 
carries what can be thought of as low bargaining costs due to its informal 
status. Perhaps most important, it does not necessarily require extensive 
participation by heads of state or lengthy ratification procedures. Instead, 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.
 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(a)–(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
14. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004).
15. Id. at 19.
16. Brummer, supra note 6.
17. Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 327, 342 (2010).
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agreements can be entered into between administrative agencies and 
technocrats—with relatively little interference by outsiders.18
 Soft law provides a practical and efficient means of adopting rules. But are these 
rules effective? According to Berkeley Law Professor and Associate Dean Andrew 
Guzman, “compliance occurs due to state concern about both reputational and direct 
sanctions triggered by violations of the law.”19 He adds that emphasizing incentives 
for compliance reveals that soft law “should be recognized as part of a spectrum of 
commitment along which states choose to locate their promises.”20 For example, 
countries failing to adopt certain regulations may be perceived as risky or, worse, 
conducive of dangerous activities. Such a reputation could result in negative responses 
from other states or private actors.
iii.  thE finanCiaL aCtiOn tasK fOrCE
 A. History and Structure
 The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (today shortened to the 
Financial Action Task Force) was formed under the initiative of the G7 and the 
European Commission following the 1989 G7 Summit in Paris.21 Its original 
purpose was to coordinate global efforts against money laundering related to drug 
trafficking. In 1996, the FATF broadened the scope of its Recommendations to 
include predicate crimes other than drug trafficking.22 In 2001, the FATF’s mandate 
expanded to include coordinating efforts in the global fight against terrorist 
financing, which led to the creation of eight Special Recommendations (a ninth was 
added in 2004). Together, the original and Special Recommendations are known as 
the FATF 40+9 Recommendations. Other focuses include financial inclusion for the 
poor, governmental corruption, voluntary tax compliance programs, and enhanced 
coordination with the private sector.
 In 2012, the FATF’s members renewed and extended the organization’s mandate 
until 2020. The key elements of the new mandate clarify expectations for global money 
laundering and terrorist financing regulation, promote implementation of the FATF 
Recommendations, identify new and emerging threats to the global financial system, 
and increase engagement with various stakeholders—including the private sector.23
18. Brummer, supra note 2, at 631.
19. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1823, 1827 (2002).
20. Id. at 1828.
21. History of the FATF, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/ 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
22. Predicate crimes are other “serious offenses” as defined by FATF member states in their national legislation. 
Fin. Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Annual Report 1995–1996, at 24 (June 28, 1996), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1995%201996%20ENG.pdf.
23. Fin. Action Task Force, Fin. Action Task Force Mandate (2012–2020), at 2–3 (Apr. 12, 2012), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FINAL%20FATF%20MANDATE%20
2012-2020.pdf [hereinafter Mandate].
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 The FATF’s membership is comprised of direct members, who are immediately 
involved in the FATF’s work, and indirect members, who take part via FATF-Style 
Regional Bodies (FSRBs). As of April 2014, the organization’s direct membership 
includes thirty-four member states and two regional organizations (the European 
Commission (EC) and the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)).24 In order to become 
a FATF member, an applicant must be considered “strategically important.” This 
designation takes into account quantitative factors such as population and gross 
domestic product, qualitative factors such as the relative importance of the applicant’s 
financial sector, and additional factors such as the applicant’s adherence to financial 
industry standards and participation in other international organizations.25 Prospective 
members must issue a high-level written commitment to the FATF and the 
Recommendations.26 Following a consultation between FATF staff and the relevant 
national political and regulatory officials, the FATF Plenary may decide to give the 
applicant “observer status.” Upon completion of a satisfactory Mutual Evaluation, 
which may require a corrective action plan for areas deemed noncompliant, an observer 
becomes eligible for membership in the FATF.27 In total, the FATF covers more than 
190 jurisdictions, and includes most major financial centers. Twenty-one observer 
organizations take part in the FATF’s work, including the IMF, World Bank, United 
Nations, and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.
 The FATF Secretariat is housed in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development’s (OECD) headquarters in Paris and employs experts in law, 
regulation, and enforcement, as well as administrative staff.28 The Secretariat’s 
primary functions are to: support the activities of the FATF and its working groups; 
facilitate cooperation between members, associate members, and observers; ensure 
efficient communications; manage FATF records, correspondence, and web sites; 
and carry out other functions assigned by the FATF president or Plenary.29
 B. FATF Strategies: Recommendations and Assessments 
 In 1990, a year after its inception, the FATF issued the original 40 Recommendations 
on anti-money laundering (AML), which provided an outline of what the FATF 
24. FATF Members and Observers, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/
membersandobservers/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
25. FATF Membership Policy, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gaf i.org/pages/aboutus/
membersandobservers/fatfmembershippolicy.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
26. Process and Criteria for Becoming a FATF Member, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/membershipprocessandcriteria.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
27. Id.
28. FATF Secretariat, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/fatfsecretariat/ 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Founded in 1961, the thirty-four member Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides a forum for global economic policy development. In 
addition to housing the FATF, the OECD issues guidance related to money laundering designed to 
complement the FATF’s work, particularly in the area of taxation. See Money Laundering, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/toolkit/moneylaundering.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
29. FATF Secretariat, supra note 28.
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considers an adequate AML regulatory framework. The current version of the 
Recommendations covers seven categories, representing the major components of the 
AML and combating terrorist financing (CFT) regime (collectively AML/CFT).30 A 
country that has adopted all of the Recommendations is considered to have a well-
designed and comprehensive AML/CFT regime. Recommendations concerning the 
criminalization of money laundering, oversight of financial institutions, due diligence, 
suspicious activity reporting, and the aggregation and sharing of information nationally 
and internationally are particularly important. Compliance with the 40+9 
Recommendations is assessed on a country-by-country basis through year-long mutual 
evaluations. Experts employed by the Secretariat conduct the evaluations and make 
on-site visits before producing a draft report that is shared with the subject country, 
FATF members, and observers. After revisions, the Plenary adopts the final report, 
which is made public. Evaluations are conducted using a consistent methodology and 
documentation under the direction of the FATF Secretariat, IMF, or World Bank.
 If the final evaluation finds that a country’s AML/CFT regime is deficient in 
regard to any of the Recommendations, the country is required to submit a follow-up 
report after two years, describing improvements made to address observed weaknesses. 
In the case of serious deficiencies, or where the Plenary finds insufficient progress in 
remediating observed weaknesses, more frequent reporting may be required.
 The FATF’s methodology also mandates more frequent reporting when a country is 
rated as partially compliant or noncompliant on Recommendations 1 (assessing risk), 5 
(criminalizing terrorist financing), 10 (customer due diligence), 13 (correspondent 
banking), or Special Recommendations II or IV (terrorist financing). For example, in 
2010, Argentina was found to be deficient nearly across-the-board, and the country was 
placed on a regular reporting schedule.31 After its eleventh follow-up report in June 
2014, Argentina was found to have significantly improved its AML/CFT regime and 
was removed from the regular reporting process.32
 The FATF publicizes the most serious cases after each Plenary, a tactic Brummer 
refers to as “name and shame.”33 Offending countries may appear on one of two lists. 
The first list identifies countries that have strategic AML/CFT weaknesses, but 
have provided a high-level commitment to addressing them. More than a dozen 
countries appear on this list at any given time. The second list, also known as “the 
blacklist,” identifies two categories of noncompliant countries: (1) those with AML/
30. The categories include assessing policies and promoting national coordination, defining money laundering 
and permitting confiscation of illicit funds, combating terrorist financing and proliferation, establishing 
preventative measures, identifying beneficial ownership, defining the powers and responsibilities of 
authorities and institutions, and fostering international cooperation. Fin. Action Task Force, The 
FATF Recommendations (Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf [hereinafter 2012 Recommendations].
31. Fin. Action Task Force, Mutual Evaluation Report: Argentina (Oct. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20Argentina.pdf.
32. Fin. Action Task Force, Mutual Evaluation of Argentina: 11th Follow-Up Report (2014), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/FUR%20Argentina_reduced.pdf.
33. Brummer, supra note 2, at 640.
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CFT deficiencies to which countermeasures apply; and (2) those with deficiencies 
that have not committed to an action plan or have failed to make sufficient progress 
against one.
 Countries to which countermeasures apply are essentially ostracized from the 
global financial system; countries that have not committed to an action plan risk a 
similar outcome. Private actors may consider the FATF’s findings in their own 
assessments of geographic risk, thereby making the delivery of financial services 
more difficult and costly. The reputational costs for appearing on any of the FATF’s 
lists create a market-based incentive to adopt the Recommendations.
 As of June 2014, four countries—Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, and Myanmar—
were found to have deficiencies warranting attention by both FATF members and 
non-members.34 The FATF has identified two jurisdictions, Iran and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, for which members and non-members are encouraged to 
apply countermeasures under Recommendation 19.35 Countermeasures may include 
steps that are “gradual, proportionate, and flexible” and are designed to compel an 
offending state to commit itself to remediating its AML/CFT weaknesses under the 
FATF’s supervision.36 These measures may include: increasing requirements for 
financial institutions doing business with customers in the jurisdiction; increasing 
reporting of suspicious activities; limiting access to FATF-member economies for 
banks based in the noncompliant jurisdiction; and publicizing money laundering 
risks associated with the jurisdiction to non-financial sectors.37 Iran and North Korea 
appear to be perennial members of these lists. However, other countries, such as 
Nauru (listed from 2001 to 2005), Ukraine (listed from 2001 to 2002), and Myanmar 
(listed from 2003 to 2004), have been successful in being delisted through domestic 
reforms aimed at implementing some or all of the Recommendations.38
 In 2012, the FATF revised its 40+9 Recommendations and adopted a more 
explicit risk-based (as opposed to rules-based) approach to AML/CFT.39 In 2013, 
34. FATF Public Statement, Fin. Action Task Force (June 27, 2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/
high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-statement-june-2014.html.
35. Id. Recommendation 19 reads, in part: “Countries should be able to apply appropriate countermeasures 
when called upon to do so by the FATF. Countries should also be able to apply countermeasures 
independently of any call by the FATF to do so. Such countermeasures should be effective and 
proportionate to the risks.” 2012 Recommendations, supra note 30, at 19.
36. Fin. Action Task Force, Annual Review of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 
2006–2007: Eighth NCCT Review, at 4 (Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/
fatf/documents/reports/2006%202007%20NCCT%20ENG.pdf.
37. Id.
38. See id. Even though the FATF may lift a recommendation for countermeasures, member states may 
choose to impose countermeasures for a longer period of time. For example, the United States did not 
lift sanctions against Myanmar until 2012. See Annie Lowrey, U.S. Sanctions on Myanmar Formally 
Eased, N.Y. Times (July 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/world/asia/us-sanctions-on-
myanmar-formally-eased.html.
39. A risk-based approach to anti-money laundering and combating terrorist financing (AML/CFT) permits 
financial institutions and other actors to concentrate their due diligence, monitoring, and reporting efforts 
on customers, products, and geographies assessed as high risk for money laundering or terrorist financing, 
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the FATF issued a revised methodology, placing a greater emphasis on measuring 
the effectiveness of countries’ AML/CFT regimes.40 Under the revised methodology, 
in addition to technical compliance with the 40+9 Recommendations, examiners are 
required to consider qualitative aspects of a country’s AML/CFT regulatory system. 
Therefore, a country that passes a law against money laundering may be found to be 
technically compliant, but an absence of prosecution under that law may signal a lack 
of effectiveness requiring further action.
 C. Outcomes and Limitations 
 Since 1989, the FATF has had remarkable success in building a global consensus 
around the appropriate content of AML/CFT regulations and creating both negative 
and positive incentives for compliance with the 40+9 Recommendations. There is a 
strong relationship between the FATF’s efforts and the adoption of more consistent 
AML/CFT frameworks globally.41 In February 2014, the FATF Plenary removed 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, and Vietnam from its ongoing monitoring 
process due to significant progress made on their action plans.42 Other countries’ 
AML/CFT systems have improved under the FATF’s supervision and were de-listed 
in the following years: Nigeria (2013), India (2013), Ukraine (2011), Israel (2002), 
and Russia (2002).
whereas a rules-based approach would require a more rigid approach to compliance and examination. See 
FATF Recommendations, supra note 30.
40. Fin. Action Task Force, Methodology: For Assessing Compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems (Feb. 2013), available at http://
www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013%20.
pdf [hereinafter Methodology].
41. Committing to the Recommendations, consenting to the mutual evaluation process, and agreeing to 
take an active part in the FATF’s work are all prerequisites of membership in the FATF and the FSRBs. 
See Process and Criteria for Becoming a FATF Member, supra note 26.
42. Outcomes from the Meeting of the FATF Plenary, Fin. Action Task Force (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/documents/news/plenary-outcomes-feb-2014.html. For example, in June 2013, the FATF 
issued the following statement regarding Vietnam:
Vietnam has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including passage 
of its counter-terrorism legislation. However, despite Vietnam’s high-level political 
commitment to work with the FATF and [the Asia/Pacific Group (APG)] to address 
its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Vietnam has not made sufficient progress in 
implementing its action plan, and certain strategic AML/CFT deficiencies remain. 
Vietnam should continue to work with the FATF and APG on implementing its action 
plan to address these deficiencies, including by: (1) establishing and implementing 
adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (2) making legal persons 
subject to criminal liability in line with international standards; and (3) strengthening 
international co-operation.
 By February of 2014, the Plenary determined that Vietnam had made progress against the specific 
action items and chose to remove the country from the regular review process. See FATF Public 
Statement, Fin. Action Task Force (June 21, 2013), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-
cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-statement-june-2013.html. 
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 The FATF’s influence goes beyond the effectiveness of its naming and shaming 
tactics. Its work has been endorsed by intergovernmental partners that include the 
IMF, United Nations, World Bank, and G20. Furthermore, several of the 40+9 
Recommendations incorporate the requirements of United Nations Security Council 
resolutions targeting terrorist financing. The Recommendations also require members 
to become a party to international agreements, such as the Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention), the Convention against 
Corruption, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, which (among other things) commit U.N. member states to take coordinated 
action against international financial crimes.
 Finally, the FATF has acquired tremendous authority by aligning itself with U.S. 
national security strategies. Many core Recommendations contain provisions that 
have been a part of U.S. federal law since 1970.43 Furthermore, the Nine Special 
Recommendations were adopted in coordination with U.S. efforts to combat terrorist 
financing following the attacks of September 11, 2001.44
 Despite its successes, the international AML/CFT regime promoted by the 
FATF is not without critics. Some commentators argue that the FATF imposes 
unreasonable or inappropriate expectations on developing countries.45 Others note 
that the FATF has unreasonably applied the 40+9 Recommendations to lawyers 
without considering attorney-client privilege and other ethical considerations. A 
2014 report by the Center on Law & Globalization, a partnership between the 
University of Illinois College of Law and the American Bar Association, suggests 
that there is little evidence that the global AML/CFT regime (under the FATF and 
IMF) has achieved its stated goals, and that the regime created significant costs for 
both private and public actors in the process.46 According to the authors:
To date there is no substantial effort by any international organization, including 
the IMF, to assess either the costs or benefits of the AML/CFT regime. The 
FATF system has proceeded as if it produces only public and private goods, not 
public or private “bads” or adverse by-products against which the “goods” have to 
be weighed. . . . There needs to be more open acknowledgement of actual and 
potential financial costs of AML/CFT controls, their potential misuse by 
authoritarian rulers, and possible adverse effects on populations that rely on 
43. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1970).
44. Juan Zarate, former deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor for combating 
terrorism, describes the importance of the FATF to the U.S. national security offensive in his recent 
book. See generally Juan C. Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial 
Warfare (2013).
45. See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, The Financial Action Task Force and Global Administrative Law, J. Prof. 
Law., 2010, at 197, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1621877.
46. Terence C. Halliday et al., Global Surveillance of Dirty Money: Assessing Assessments of 
Regimes to Control Money-Laundering and Combat the Financing of Terrorism (Jan. 30, 
2014), available at http://www.lexglobal.org/files/Report_Global%20Surveillance%20of%20Dirty%20
Money%201.30.2014.pdf.
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remittances and the informal economy, as well as potential negative impacts on 
[non-governmental organizations] and parts of civil society.47
 D. Technical Compliance Versus Effectiveness
 The FATF has described a widely accepted AML/CFT framework and moved the 
world toward consistency in laws and regulations. However, the FATF’s methods have 
not proven to be effective in achieving perfect compliance with the Recommendations. 
Implementation is uneven and an impasse may have been reached with respect to key 
Recommendations relating to gatekeepers—including the legal profession.
 In 2006, the most recent U.S. Mutual Evaluation Report found that the country 
had failed to implement some of the 40+9 Recommendations targeting financial 
gatekeepers, which include attorneys, accountants, and casinos.48 Although generally 
a leader in AML/CFT regulation and compliance, the United States was found to be 
noncompliant with three Recommendations and only partially compliant with two. 
With the fourth round of evaluations approaching, it remains to be seen whether the 
United States will fully comply with all of the 40+9 Recommendations and, if not, 
whether the country will face countermeasures or other sanctioning actions from the 
FATF.49 Given the FATF’s recently revised methodology, it is possible that the 
United States will be found technically noncompliant with the Recommendations, 
yet somehow effective at achieving the Recommendations’ overall goals.50
iV. COnCLUsiOn
 Proponents of soft law in international financial regulation argue that soft law is 
f lexible, quickly deployable, and capable of incentivizing nations to make good on 
their promises. Furthermore, it avoids many of the difficulties associated with treaty-
based lawmaking including the need for lengthy negotiations, the challenge of 
47. Id. at 7. For example, the report noted that Mauritius required twenty-five staff members for its national 
financial intelligence unit, “a significant component of its financial regulatory resources, especially for 
largely non-prudential regulation.” Meanwhile, resources were diverted from staff and the purchase of 
technology needed for compliance with increased AML/CFT regulations to the detriment of other 
economic activities. Id. at 48.
48. Fin. Action Task Force, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism: United States of America (June 23, 2006), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20US%20full.pdf.
49. In the absence of specific legal and regulatory requirements, the American Bar Association’s Task Force 
on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession has issued the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance, 
instructing attorneys on how to apply a risk-based approach to anti-money laundering and terrorist 
financing in light of the FATF Recommendations. See Am. Bar Ass’n, Voluntary Good Practices 
Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
(2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal_justice/
voluntary_good_practices_guidance.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on 
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Opinion 463: Client Due Diligence, Money 
Laundering, and Terrorist Financing (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/formal_opinion_463.authcheckdam.pdf.
50. See Methodology, supra note 40, at 16.
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overcoming domestic resistance, and inconsistencies in adoption. In his article 
Against Consent, Guzman concludes that the international community may be well 
served by exploring alternatives to consent-based (i.e., treaty-based) approaches to 
critical global problems ranging from weapons proliferation to global warming. The 
treaty system has failed to produce robust, sustainable, and timely solutions to these 
issues. While imperfect, the greatest short-term value could be derived from the 
work of international organizations. Guzman writes:
International organizations are a well-established part of the international 
system, and are already engaged in a wide range of soft-law activities. The best 
response to the consent problem in the short term would be for [international 
organizations] to, at the margin, become more aggressive and speak with a 
stronger voice. States and commentators, in turn, should bolster these efforts. 
We should acknowledge the critical role that [international organizations] 
have to play, and we should put more pressure on reluctant states to follow the 
[their] recommendations, guidelines, proposals, and so on.51
 The FATF demonstrates that under the right conditions, it is possible to achieve 
substantial, albeit imperfect, legal and regulatory coordination across the globe. 
Through more than two decades of sustained promotion, evaluation, and enforcement 
of the 40+9 Recommendations, the FATF and its members have managed to bring 
uniformity to most national AML/CFT regimes. It seems that hard law, whether by 
a treaty or other international agreement, need not be one of the conditions for 
effective international regulation.
51. Andrew T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. 747, 789 (2012).
